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Abstract
Two intimately related new classes of games are introduced and studied: entropy games
(EGs) and matrix multiplication games (MMGs). An EG is played on a finite arena by two-
and-a-half players: Despot, Tribune and the non-deterministic People. Despot wants to make
the set of possible People’s behaviors as small as possible, while Tribune wants to make it as
large as possible. An MMG is played by two players that alternately write matrices from some
predefined finite sets. One wants to maximize the growth rate of the product, and the other
to minimize it. We show that in general MMGs are undecidable in quite a strong sense. On
the positive side, EGs correspond to a subclass of MMGs, and we prove that such MMGs and
EGs are determined, and that the optimal strategies are simple. The complexity of solving
such games is in NP ∩ coNP.
1 Introduction
In recent years, some of us have been working on a new non-probabilistic quantitative approach to
classical models in computer science based on the notion of language entropy (growth rate). This
approach has produced new insights about timed automata and languages [1] as well as temporal
logics [2]. In this article, we apply it to game theory and obtain a new natural class of games
that we call entropy games (EGs). Such a game is played on a finite arena in a turn-based way,
in infinite time, by two-and-a-half1 players: Despot, Tribune and the non-deterministic People.
Whenever Despot and Tribune decide on their strategies σ and τ , it leaves a set L(σ, τ) (an ω-
language) of possible behaviors of People. Despot wants L(σ, τ) to be as small as possible, while
Tribune wants to make this language as large as possible. Formally the payoff of the game is the
entropy of L(σ, τ), with Despot minimizing and Tribune maximizing this value.
Potentially these games can be used to model hidden channel capacity problems in computer
security, where the aim of the security policy (Despot) is to minimize the information flow whatever
the environment (Tribune) does. EGs can also be rephrased in terms of population dynamics,
where one player aims to maximize the population growth rate, while the other minimizes it;
applications of this setting to medicine, ecology, and computer security (virus propagation) are
still to be explored. On the theoretical side, well-known mean-payoff games on finite graphs can
be seen as a subclass of our EGs. However the purpose of this paper is to explore the theoretical
∗The support of Agence Nationale de la Recherche under the project EQINOCS (ANR-11-BS02-004) is gratefully
acknowledged. The results of Section 4 were obtained at the Institute for Information Transmission Problems,
Russian Academy of Science, by V. Kozyakin at the expense of the Russian Science Foundation (project 14-50-
00150).
1Although this term is mostly used for stochastic games, it is also an appropriate description of EGs.
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setting of EGs, we therefore leave applications and identification of relevant subclasses of EGs for
further work.
The second class of objects studied is that of matrix multiplication games (MMGs), which
came naturally when analyzing EGs and is, in our opinion, novel and interesting on its own. In
such a game, two players, Adam and Eve, each possess a set of matrices, A and E , respectively.
The game is played in a turn-based way, in infinite time. At every turn, the player writes a matrix
from his or her set. Adam wants the norm of the product of matrices A1E1A2E2 . . . obtained to
be as small as possible (in the limit), while Eve wants it to be as large as possible. Formally, the
payoff is the growth rate of the norm of the product.
The main interest of MMGs comes from the observation that, in the case when one of the
two players is trivial (i.e. his or her set contains only the identity matrix), the game turns into
the classical, important, and difficult, problem of computing the joint spectral radius or the joint
spectral subradius of a set of matrices, see [14, 21]. Thus, MMGs is a game (or alternating)
generalization of this problem. It is thus unsurprising that, in the general case, MMGs are even
more difficult to analyze. We prove that several natural problems for MMGs are undecidable,
in particular it is impossible to distinguish between games with value 0 and 1 (and thus it is
impossible to approximate the value of an MMG).
Fortunately, MMGs have tractable subclasses. We reduce EGs to a particular subclass of
MMGs (referred to as IMMGs), when the sets A and E are so-called independent row uncertainty
sets of non-negative matrices [4], and show that for this class the game can be solved: it is
determined, and for each player the optimal strategy is to write one and the same matrix at every
turn. This result is based on a new, quite technical, minimax theorem on the spectral radius of
products of the type AB where both A and B belong to sets of matrices with independent row
uncertainties. We deduce that EGs are determined, and that the optimal strategies for Despot and
Tribune are positional. A careful complexity analysis of the games considered (EGs and IMMGs)
allows to prove that comparing their value to a rational constant can be done with complexity
NP ∩ coNP.
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we recall useful notions from linear algebra
and language theory. In Section 3 we formally define the two games and show how they are
related, we also prove undecidability of general MMGs. In Section 4 we prove the key technical
minimax theorem for matrices. In Section 5 we prove the main properties of EGs and IMMGs:
determinacy, existence of simple strategies and complexity bounds. In Section 6 we relate the EGs
studied here to classical mean-payoff games and a new kind of population games. We conclude
with a discussion on the perspectives. The Appendix contains proofs of all lemmas.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Some Linear Algebra
Given two vectors x, y ∈ RN , we write x > y, if xi > yi for each 1 6 i 6 N . Similar notation
will be applied to matrices. We denote by ‖ · ‖ the 1-norm of vectors and matrices. Note that, for
non-negative vectors and matrices, ‖x‖ =∑i xi.
Let A be an (N × N)-matrix. Its spectral radius is defined as the maximal modulus of its
eigenvalues and denoted by ρ(A). It characterizes the growth rate of An for n → ∞: according
to Gelfand’s formula ρ(A) = limn→∞ ‖An‖1/n. The spectral radius depends continuously on the
matrix, and is monotone for non-negative matrices [13, Corollary 8.1.19]: ρ(A) 6 ρ(B) when
0 6 A 6 B. If A > 0, i.e. all the elements of A are positive, then by the Perron-Frobenius
theorem, the number ρ(A) is a simple eigenvalue of the matrix A, and all the other eigenvalues of
A are strictly less than ρ(A) in modulus. The eigenvector v = (v1, v2, . . . , vN )
T corresponding to
the eigenvalue ρ(A) (normalized, for example, by the equation
∑
vi = 1) is uniquely determined
and positive.
Following [4], given N sets of M -dimensional rows Ai we define the IRU-set (independent row
uncertainty set) A of (N ×M)-matrices that consists of all matrices of the form A = (aij)16i6N
16j6M
wherein each of the rows ai = [ai1, ai2, . . . , aiM ] belongs to the respective Ai. We will need several
simple properties of IRU-sets.
Lemma 1. For an IRU-set A formed by sets of rows A1,A2, . . . ,AN the following holds:
(i) for any matrix B the set AB = {AB
∣∣ A ∈ A } is IRU as well;
(ii) the convex hull conv(A ) is the IRU-set formed by the row sets conv(A1), . . . , conv(AN);
(iii) the set A is compact if and only if so are all the row sets A1,A2, . . . ,AN .
2.2 Joint Spectral Radius and Subradius
The joint spectral radius [8, 9, 18] of a bounded set A of (N × N)-matrices characterizes the
maximal growth rate of products of n matrices from the set and admits the following equivalent
definitions (where the identity between the upper and the lower formulas constitutes the famous
Berger-Wang Theorem [3]):
ρˆ(A ) = lim
n→∞
sup
{
‖A1 · · ·An‖1/n
∣∣∣ Ai ∈ A } = inf
n>1
sup
{
‖A1 · · ·An‖1/n
∣∣∣ Ai ∈ A }
= lim
n→∞
sup
{
ρ(A1 · · ·An)1/n
∣∣∣ Ai ∈ A } = sup
n>1
sup
{
ρ(A1 · · ·An)1/n
∣∣∣ Ai ∈ A } . (1)
For a compact (closed and bounded) set A , the suprema in (1) may be replaced by maxima.
The joint spectral subradius [12], or lower spectral radius, corresponds to the minimal growth
rate of products of matrices:
ρˇ(A ) = lim
n→∞
inf
{
‖A1 · · ·An‖1/n
∣∣∣ Ai ∈ A } = inf
n>1
inf
{
‖A1 · · ·An‖1/n
∣∣∣ Ai ∈ A }
= lim
n→∞
inf
{
ρ(A1 · · ·An)1/n
∣∣∣ Ai ∈ A } = inf
n>1
inf
{
ρ(A1 · · ·An)1/n
∣∣∣ Ai ∈ A } .
The equivalence of the characterizations based on norms and on spectral radii is established in [12,
Theorem B1] for finite sets A , and in [20, Lemma 1.12] and [7, Theorem 1] for arbitrary sets A .
Calculating the joint and lower spectral radii is a challenging problem, and only in exceptional
cases these characteristics may be found explicitly, see, e.g., [14, 15] and the bibliography therein.
The case of compact IRU-sets of non-negative matrices is such an exception, for which ρˆ and ρˇ
admit a simple characterization: as stated in [16, Theorem 2], for such a set A the following
equalities hold:
ρˆ(A ) = max
A∈A
ρ(A), ρˇ(A ) = min
A∈A
ρ(A). (2)
Compact IRU-sets of non-negative matrices and their convex hulls have another useful property:
as is shown in [16, Corollary 1],
max
A∈A
ρ(A) = max
A∈conv(A )
ρ(A), min
A∈A
ρ(A) = min
A∈conv(A )
ρ(A), (3)
and hence ρˆ(A ) = ρˆ(conv(A )), ρˇ(A ) = ρˇ(conv(A )).
2.3 Entropy of an ω-Language
The notion of entropy of a language and methods for computing it in the case of regular languages
were introduced in [6] for finite words and in [19] for infinite ones. We will use the latter definition.
The entropy of an ω-language L ⊆ Σω is defined as
H(L) = lim sup
n→∞
log |prefn(L)|
n
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(all the logarithms here are in base 2), where prefn(L) is the set of prefixes of length n of infinite
words in L. Intuitively, H(L) is the information content (“bandwidth”), measured in bits per
symbol, in typical words of the language. In particular, H(Σω) = log |Σ|.
For a regular L ⊆ Σω accepted by a given Bu¨chi automaton, its entropy can be effectively
computed as follows: compute the (finite) automaton recognizing pref(L), determinize it, and
compute the entropy as the logarithm of the spectral radius of the adjacency matrix of the au-
tomaton obtained.
3 The Two Games
3.1 Entropy Games
Consider the arena (D,T,Σ,∆) where D and T are disjoint finite sets of vertices (of two players),
Σ a finite alphabet of actions and ∆ ⊆ T × Σ × D ∪ D × Σ × T is a transition relation. Given
such an arena, we define a game with two-and-a-half players: Despot, Tribune and People. The
latter plays non-deterministically and counts for half a player. People chooses the initial state in
D. When the game is in a state d of D, Despot plays an action a ∈ Σ and the game changes to
some t ∈ T (chosen by People) such that (d, a, t) ∈ ∆. Then, Tribune plays an action b ∈ Σ and
the game changes its state to d′ ∈ D, again chosen by People and such that (t, b, d′) ∈ ∆. It is
again Despot’s turn. The players must not block the game: they always choose an action that has
a corresponding transition (d, a, ·) ∈ ∆, or (t, b, ·) ∈ ∆, respectively. We assume that the arena is
non-blocking: at every state there is at least one such transition. Figure 1 shows an example of
such an arena, which we will use as a running example in this paper.
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Figure 1: Left. Arena of our running example of an entropy game. Circles are states of the Despot
while squares are states of the Tribune. At each move, the player has to choose between actions
a and b, the outcome of which may sometimes be non-deterministic (e.g. when Despot plays a in
state d2, the next state may non-deterministically be either t1 or t3). Right. A finite play on this
arena. Despot plays ab (whatever his opponent does) while Tribune plays aa. We only give, for
each step, the number of words that end up in each state controlled by the active player.
A play of the EG is a finite or infinite sequence π ∈ (D · Σ · T · Σ)∞ compatible with the
transition relation ∆. Note that four letters in a row correspond to one turn of the game. A
strategy σ for Despot is a function (D · Σ · T · Σ)∗ ·D → Σ that, given any finite play ending in
a D state, outputs an action taken by Despot. The strategy is positional if it only depends on
the current state of the game, i.e. it can be expressed just as σ(d). A strategy τ for Tribune is a
function (D · Σ · T · Σ)∗ ·D · Σ · T → Σ which, given any finite play ending in a T state, outputs
the action taken by Tribune. The strategy is positional if it only depends on the current state
of the game. In a natural way we define plays compatible with a Despot’s strategy σ, or with
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a Tribune’s strategy τ . Then, given σ and τ , we have an ω-language L(σ, τ) containing all the
plays compatible with σ and τ . In other words, L(σ, τ) is the set of runs that People can choose if
Despot and Tribune commit themselves to σ and τ . What makes EGs different from other games
(parity/mean-payoff etc.) is that the payoff does not depend on a single run of the game, but
on the whole set of possible runs. More precisely, the payoff (the amount that Despot pays to
Tribune) is defined as
P (σ, τ) = lim sup
n→∞
|pref4n(L(σ, τ))|1/n ,
that is the growth rate (w.r.t. the number of turns) of the number of plays available to the People
under the strategies σ and τ . Note that the payoff is a monotone function of the entropy of L(σ, τ),
indeed
P (σ, τ) = 24H(L(σ,τ)),
i.e. Despot tries to diminish the entropy while Tribune aims to augment it.
3.2 Matrix Multiplication Games
Let A be a set ofM×N -matrices and E ofN×M -matrices. The MMG between two players, Adam
and Eve, is played as follows: in turn, for every i ∈ N, Adam writes a matrix Ai ∈ A and then Eve
writes a matrix Ei ∈ E . Formally, we define a play as an infinite sequence A1E1A2E2 . . . AiEi . . .
with Ai ∈ A and Ei ∈ E . A strategy for Adam is a function σ : (A · E )∗ → A that maps any
finite history (which is a sequence of matrices) to Adam’s next move. Similarly, a strategy for Eve
is a mapping τ : (A · E )∗ · A → E . A strategy is called constant if it does not depend on the
history, i.e. is given by just one matrix: σ = A ∈ A or τ = E ∈ E . We define a play compatible
with a strategy σ (or τ) in a natural way. Note that, given a strategy σ for Adam and a strategy
τ for Eve, there exists a unique play π(σ, τ) compatible with both of them. The payoff of a play
π = A1E1A2E2 . . . AiEi . . . (that is, the amount that Adam pays to Eve) is the growth rate of the
norm of the infinite product of matrices:
P (π) = P (σ, τ) = lim sup
k→∞
∥∥∥∥∥
k∏
i=1
AiEi
∥∥∥∥∥
1/k
.
3.3 General Matrix Multiplication Games are Undecidable
The difficulty of general MMGs should be compared with results on the difficulty of JSR (joint
spectral radius) computation. Thus, as proved in [5, Thm 2], given a finite set E of non-negative
matrices with rational elements, it is undecidable whether ρˆ(E ) 6 1. The decidability status of
the problem ρˆ(E ) < 1 is unknown. Finally, it is immediate from the characterization (1) that,
given a precision ε > 0, it is possible to compute ε-approximation of ρˆ(E ) (in other words ρˆ(E ) is
computable as function of E in the sense of computable analysis, see [23]).
Theorem 2. Given a determined MMG with finite sets of non-negative matrices with rational
elements and α ∈ Q+, the decision problem for its value V 6 α is undecidable.
Proof. Let A = {Id} (Adam is trivial) and E be a finite set of non-negative matrices with
rational elements. The corresponding MMG is determined with value V = ρˆ(E ) and thus the
decision problem V 6 1 is undecidable due to [5, Thm 2], cited above.
To prove stronger undecidability results for MMGs without direct counterparts for the JSR,
we need a couple of simulation lemmas: for arbitrary matrices and for non-negative ones.
Lemma 3. Given a two-counter machine M , one can construct two finite sets of integer matrices
A and E such that the corresponding MMG is determined and its value V satisfies:
“if M halts (starting with counters containing 0) then V = 0, else V = 1.”
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Lemma 4. Given a two-counter machine M , one can construct two finite sets of non-negative
integer matrices A and E such that the corresponding MMG satisfies:
“if M halts then Adam can ensure payoff < 2, otherwise Eve can ensure payoff > 2.”
In both cases the construction, inspired by [10], follows the same principle: Eve tries to simulate
the machine M ; if she cheats, then Adam detects this and “resets” the product. Since the halting
problem is undecidable, we obtain immediately the following two theorems.
Theorem 5. Given a determined MMG with finite sets of matrices with integer elements
• its value V is not computable from the matrices;
• it is not computable even knowing a priori that V ∈ {0, 1}.
Hence the MMG value cannot be approximated and is not computable (as function of A and
E ) in the sense of computable analysis.
Theorem 6. Given an MMG with finite sets of non-negative matrices with integer elements, it
is undecidable whether the maximal payoff that Eve can ensure is < 2.
3.4 Relations Between the Two Kinds of Games
Fortunately, as will be shown below, the subclass of MMGs with IRU-sets of non-negative matrices
is much easier to solve. In this section, we relate EGs to such MMGs.
Let A = (D,T,Σ,∆) be an arena with D = {d1, . . . , dM} and T = {t1, . . . , tN}. We define
matrix sets A , E as follows. For each Despot’s vertex di ∈ D, and action a ∈ Σ we define the row
cia = [cia,1, . . . , cia,N ] where cia,j = 1 if (di, a, tj) ∈ ∆ and cia,j = 0 otherwise. Next we define
the row set Ai = {cia 6= 0
∣∣ a ∈ Σ} (non-zero rows correspond to non-blocking actions). Row
sets A1, . . . ,AM determine an IRU-set of matrices A . The IRU-set E corresponding to Tribune’s
actions is defined similarly. In the running example in Figure 1, for instance, the row sets are the
following: A1 = {[1, 1, 0]} ,A2 = {[0, 1, 0] , [1, 0, 1]} ,A3 = {[0, 1, 1]} , E1 = {[0, 1, 0] , [1, 0, 0]} , E2 =
{[1, 1, 1]} , E3 = {[0, 1, 0] , [0, 0, 1]}.
Note first that there is a natural bijection between the positional strategies of Despot and the
set A : any positional strategy σ : D → Σ corresponds to the matrix Aσ ∈ A with i-th row ci,σ(di)
for Adam. Similarly, a positional strategy of Tribune τ corresponds to Eve’s matrix Eτ ∈ E . The
following lemma generalizes this observation to any type of strategies:
Lemma 7. Let A be an arena and A , E the corresponding IRU matrix sets. Then for every pair
of strategies (σ, τ) of Despot and Tribune in the EG on A there exists a pair of strategies (ς, θ) of
Adam and Eve in the MMG (conv(A ), conv(E )) with exactly the same payoff. Moreover, if σ is
positional, then ς is constant and permanently chooses Aσ. The case of positional τ is similar.
Note that Lemma 7 provides a rather weak relation between two games and does not mean, by
itself, that the two games have the same value. However, we will show later (cf. Lemma 15) that
optimal constant strategies in the MMG that belong to A and E are in bijection with optimal
positional strategies in the EG.
4 Minimax Theorem for IRU-Sets of Matrices
In this section, we prove the key theorem of this article.
Theorem 8. Let A be a compact IRU-set of non-negative (N×M)-matrices and B be a compact
IRU-set of non-negative (M ×N)-matrices. Then
min
A∈A
max
B∈B
ρ(AB) = max
B∈B
min
A∈A
ρ(AB). (4)
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In the rest of the article we will denote this minimax by mm(A ,B). The study of minimax
relations will be based on the following well-known fact:
Lemma 9 (see [22, Section 13.4]). Let f(x, y) be a continuous function on the product of compact
spaces X × Y . Then
min
x
max
y
f(x, y) > max
y
min
x
f(x, y).
The exact equality holds if and only if there exists a saddle point, i.e. a point (x0, y0) satisfying
the inequalities
f(x0, y) 6 f(x0, y0) 6 f(x, y0)
for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y .
We will also use two lemmas on matrices. The first one provides spectral radius bounds and is
quite standard in Perron-Frobenius theory; as usual in this theory it relates global characteristics
of a non-negative matrix (such as spectral radius) with its behavior on one non-negative vector.
Lemma 10. Let A be a non-negative (N ×N)-matrix; then the following properties hold:
(i) if Au 6 ρu for some vector u > 0, then ρ > 0 and ρ(A) 6 ρ;
(ii) if furthermore A > 0 and Au 6= ρu, then ρ(A) < ρ;
(iii) if Au > ρu for some non-zero vector u > 0 and some number ρ > 0, then ρ(A) > ρ;
(iv) if furthermore Au 6= ρu, then ρ(A) > ρ.
The next lemma concerning IRU-sets of matrices is new and can be explained as follows. For
an IRU-set of matrices and two vectors u and v we imagine that the sets Bl = {x : x 6 v} and
Bu = {x : v 6 x} form the lower and upper bulbs of an hourglass with the neck at the point v.
The lemma asserts that either all the grains Au (for all matrices A in the set) fill one of the bulbs,
or there remains at least one grain in the other bulb. Clearly this alternative does not hold for
general sets of matrices.
Lemma 11 (hourglass alternative). Let A be an IRU-set of (N ×M)-matrices and let A˜u = v
for some matrix A˜ ∈ A and vectors u, v. Then the following holds:
(i) either Au > v for all A ∈ A or exists a matrix A¯ ∈ A such that A¯u 6 v and A¯u 6= v;
(ii) either Au 6 v for all A ∈ A or exists a matrix A¯ ∈ A such that A¯u > v and A¯u 6= v.
We are ready to prove the minimax theorem.
Proof of Theorem 8. According to Lemma 9, the minimax equality (4) may occur if and only if
some matrices A˜ ∈ A and B˜ ∈ B satisfy the inequalities
ρ(A˜B) 6 ρ(A˜B˜) for all B ∈ B; (5)
ρ(A˜B˜) 6 ρ(AB˜) for all A ∈ A . (6)
Consider first the case when all the matrices in A and B are positive. To construct the
matrices A˜ ∈ A and B˜ ∈ B we proceed as follows. For each B ∈ B let AB ∈ A be a matrix that
minimizes (in A) the quantity ρ(AB). Such a matrix AB exists due to compactness of the set A
and continuity of the function ρ(AB) in A and B. Then, for each matrix B ∈ B, the relations
ρ(ABB) = min
A∈A
ρ(AB) 6 ρ(AB)
hold for all A ∈ A . Let B˜ be the matrix maximizing minA∈A ρ(AB) over the set B, and let
A˜ = AB˜. In this case
max
B∈B
ρ(ABB) = max
B∈B
min
A∈A
ρ(AB) = min
A∈A
ρ(AB˜) = ρ(AB˜B˜) = ρ(A˜B˜), (7)
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which implies inequality (6) for all A ∈ A , and it remains to prove (5) for all B ∈ B.
Let v = (v1, v2, . . . , vN )
T be the positive eigenvector of the (N ×N)-matrix A˜B˜ corresponding
to the eigenvalue ρ˜ = ρ(A˜B˜). By denoting
w = B˜v ∈ RM
we obtain that ρ˜v = A˜w. Let us show that in this case
ρ˜v 6 Aw for all A ∈ A . (8)
Otherwise, by Lemma 11(i) there would exist a matrix A¯ ∈ A such that ρ˜v > A¯w and ρ˜v 6= A¯w,
which implies, by the definition of the vector w, that ρ˜v > A¯B˜v and ρ˜v 6= A¯B˜v. Then by
Lemma 10
ρ(A¯B˜) < ρ˜ = ρ(A˜B˜),
which contradicts (6). This contradiction completes the proof of inequality (8). Similarly, now we
show that
w > Bv for all B ∈ B. (9)
Again, assuming the contrary, by Lemma 11(ii) there exists a matrix B¯ ∈ B such that w 6 B¯v
and w 6= B¯v. This last inequality, together with (8) applied to the matrix AB¯, yields ρ˜v 6 AB¯B¯v
and ρ˜v 6= AB¯B¯v. Then by Lemma 10
ρ˜ < ρ(AB¯B¯),
which contradicts (7) asserting that ρ˜ = ρ(A˜B˜) is the maximum value of the function ρ(ABB)
over all B ∈ B. This contradiction completes the proof of inequality (9).
From ρ˜v = A˜w and (9) we obtain the inequality ρ˜v > A˜Bv valid for all B ∈ B, which by
Lemma 10 implies the relations
ρ(A˜B˜) = ρ˜ > ρ(A˜B)
valid for all B ∈ B, or, which is the same, inequality (5). The theorem is proved for positive
matrices.
Consider now the general case of compact IRU-sets of non-negative matrices A and B. If
the set A is determined by some sets of M -rows Ai, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , then choose an arbitrary
ε > 0 and consider the sets of rows
A
(ε)
i = {a(ε)
∣∣ a(ε) = a+ ε[1, 1, . . . , 1], a ∈ Ai},
where i = 1, 2, . . . , N . In this case the IRU-set of matrices A (ε) consists of positive matrices
A + ε1, where A ∈ A and 1 is the matrix with all elements equal to 1. Define similarly the
IRU-set of matrices B(ε).
By the result just proved, for each ε > 0 the minimax equality holds for positive matrices:
min
A∈A (ε)
max
B∈B(ε)
ρ(AB) = max
B∈B(ε)
min
A∈A (ε)
ρ(AB),
which by Lemma 9 is equivalent to the existence of A˜ε ∈ A and B˜ε ∈ B such that
ρ((A˜ε + ε1)(B + ε1)) 6 ρ((A˜ε + ε1)(B˜ε + ε1)) 6 ρ((A+ ε1)(B˜ε + ε1))
for all A ∈ A and B ∈ B. Taking here ε = εn, where {εn} is an arbitrary sequence of positive
numbers converging to zero, we get
ρ((A˜εn + εn1)(B + εn1)) 6 ρ((A˜εn + εn1)(B˜εn + εn1)) 6 ρ((A+ εn1)(B˜εn + εn1)) (10)
for all A ∈ A and B ∈ B. Without loss of generality, in view of the compactness of the sets A and
B, we may assume the existence of matrices A˜ and B˜ such that A˜εn → A˜ ∈ A and B˜εn → B˜ ∈ B
as n→∞. Then turning to the limit in (10), we obtain the inequalities
ρ(A˜B) 6 ρ(A˜B˜) 6 ρ(AB˜)
for all A ∈ A and B ∈ B, which are equivalent to (5) and (6). This concludes the proof.
Corollary 12. For IRU-sets A and B of non-negative matrices it holds that
mm(conv(A ), conv(B)) = mm(A ,B).
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5 Solving the Games
5.1 Solving Matrix Multiplication Games for IRU-Sets
Theorem 13. Let A and E be compact IRU-sets of non-negative matrices. Then the correspond-
ing MMG is determined, and moreover Adam and Eve possess constant optimal strategies.
Proof. Let us apply Theorem 8 to matrix sets A and E . Define V , E0 and A0 such that
min
E∈E
ρ(EA0) = max
A∈A
min
E∈E
ρ(EA) = min
E∈E
max
A∈A
ρ(EA) = max
A∈A
ρ(E0A) = V. (11)
Let Adam only play A0. Take any compatible play π = A0E1A0E2 · · · and put Ci = A0Ei. Denote
C = {EA0|E ∈ E }; it is an IRU-set by Lemma 1. The payoff P for π yields
P = lim sup
n→∞
‖A0C1 · · ·Cn−1En‖1/n 6 lim sup
n→∞
(‖A0‖ · ‖C1 · · ·Cn−1‖ · ‖En‖)1/n
6 lim
n→∞
K
2
n lim sup
n→∞
‖C1 · · ·Cn−1‖ 1n−1 6 ρˆ(C ) 1= max
C∈C
ρ(C) = max
E∈E
ρ(EA0)
2
= V,
where the constant K is an upper bound for the norms of the matrices in A and E , equality 1
comes from the first equality (2) and equality 2 comes from (11).
Let Eve only play E0. Take any compatible play π
′ = A1E0A2E0 · · · . Let us write Di = AiE0.
Denote D = {AE0, A ∈ A }; it is an IRU-set. The payoff P ′ for π′ is such that
P ′ = lim sup
n→∞
‖C1 · · ·Cn‖1/n > lim inf
n→∞
‖C1 · · ·Cn‖1/n > ρˇ(D) 1= min
D∈D
ρ(D) = min
A∈A
ρ(AE0)
2
= V,
where equality 1 comes from the second equality (2) and equality 2 from (11) using the equality
ρ(EA0) = ρ(A0E).
We have proved that Adam (by constantly playing A0) can ensure payoff 6 V whatever Eve
plays; and that Eve (by constantly playing E0) can ensure payoff > V whatever Adam plays. This
concludes the proof.
Corollary 14. Let A and E be compact IRU-sets of non-negative matrices. In the MMG on
conv(A ), conv(E ), the constant optimal strategies can be chosen from sets A and E .
This follows immediately from the proof of the theorem and Corollary 12.
5.2 Solving Entropy Games
In this section, we consider an EG on an arena A and the corresponding matrix sets A and E , as
defined in Section 3.4.
Lemma 15. Let (σ, τ) be two positional strategies in the EG. Then, if corresponding constant
strategies Aσ and Eτ are optimal for their respective players in the MMG with matrix sets conv(A )
and conv(E ), then so are σ and τ .
Theorem 16. Every EG is determined, and Despot and Tribune possess positional optimal strate-
gies.
Proof. From Theorem 13, we know that for the MMG (conv(A ), conv(E )) both Adam and Eve
possess optimal strategies, which consist in constantly playing some matrices A and E. From
Corollary 14, the matrices A and E can be chosen from sets A and E , respectively. Then, there
exist positional strategies σ and τ on A such that A = Aσ and E = Eτ . By Lemma 15, strategies
σ and τ are optimal in the EG.
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Back to the running example. Here a quick exploration of the combinations of rows shows
that the matrices realizing the minimax over the two IRU-sets defined by row sets A1,A2,A3 and
E1, E2, E3 are A =
[
1 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 1
]
for Adam/Despot and E =
[
1 0 0
1 1 1
0 0 1
]
for Eve/Tribune. These matrices
describe both the optimal constant strategy of the MMG and the optimal positional strategy of the
EG induced by this arena. The value of both games is the spectral radius ρ(AE) = ρ
([
2 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 2
])
=(√
17 + 3
)
/2 ≃ 3.562.
5.3 Complexity Issues
We will analyze the complexity of solving matrix multiplication (and hence entropy) game. We
start with necessary and sufficient conditions for inequalities on joint spectral radii and subradii
of IRU-sets (recall also (2) relating them to maximal and minimal spectral radii).
Lemma 17. For any compact IRU-set of positive matrices A and α ∈ Q+ the following equiva-
lences hold:
ρˆ(A ) < α⇔ ∃v > 0 ∀A ∈ A (Av < αv); (12)
ρˆ(A ) 6 α⇔ ∃v > 0 ∀A ∈ A (Av 6 αv); (13)
ρˇ(A ) > α⇔ ∃v > 0 ∀A ∈ A (Av > αv); (14)
ρˇ(A ) > α⇔ ∃v > 0 ∀A ∈ A (Av > αv). (15)
If the matrices are only non-negative, the equivalences (12) above and (16) below hold:
ρˇ(A ) > α⇔ ∃(v > 0, v 6= 0)∀A ∈ A (Av > αv). (16)
The computational aspects of calculating the values ρˆ(A ) and ρˇ(A ) for IRU-sets of non-
negative matrices, based on relations (2), are discussed in [4, 16, 17]. These articles provide
polynomial algorithms for approximation of the minimal and maximal spectral radii, as well as
a variant of the simplex method for these problems. In the next theorem we prove a complexity
result in a form suitable for game analysis.
Theorem 18. Given a finite IRU-set of nonnegative matrices A with rational elements (rep-
resented by row sets A1, A2, . . . , AN ), and a number α ∈ Q+, the decision problems whether
ρˆ(A ) < α and whether ρˇ(A ) > α belong to the complexity class P. Moreover, if the matrices are
positive, then the decision problems ρˆ(A ) 6 α and ρˇ(A ) > α are also in P.
Proof. The polynomial algorithms are based on the previous lemma. Consider the problem of
deciding ρˆ(A ) < α, which can be rewritten using (12) as ∃v > 0 ∀A ∈ A (Av < αv). We will
not test all the matrices A ∈ A (there are exponentially many of them); instead, we will treat
each row separately. The condition ∀A ∈ A (Av < αv) can be rewritten as a system of linear
inequalities: for each i and for each row [c1, c2, . . . , cN ] ∈ Ai require that
c1v1 + c2v2 + · · ·+ cNvN < αvi.
The condition v > 0 can be written as N inequalities vi > 0: one for each coordinate. Using a
polynomial algorithm for linear programming we can decide whether a solution v satisfying all
these linear inequalities exists.
All other decision procedures, based on (13)–(16), are similar. The condition v > 0, v 6= 0 can
be represented as a disjunction of N linear systems vj > 0 ∧
∧N
i=1 vi > 0.
Theorem 19. Given two finite IRU-sets of nonnegative matrices A and B with rational elements,
and a number α ∈ Q+, the decision problem of whether mm(A ,B) < α belongs to NP ∩ coNP.
Moreover, if the matrices are positive, then the problem of whether mm(A ,B) 6 α is also in
NP ∩ coNP.
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Proof. Consider the problem of deciding whether mm(A ,B) < α, which can be rewritten as
min
A∈A
max
B∈B
ρ(BA) < α,
or equivalently
∃A0 ∈ A (ρˆ(BA0) < α).
The nondeterministic polynomial algorithm proceeds as follows:
• guess non-deterministically a matrix A0 ∈ A ;
• compute the representation of BA0 as an IRU-set generated by the row sets C1,C2, . . . ,CN ;
• check the inequality ρˆ(BA0) < α in polynomial time using Theorem 18.
We conclude that the problem mm(A ,B) < α is in NP. The complementary problem mm(A ,B) > α
is also in NP, as it can be rewritten as
max
B∈B
min
A∈A
ρ(AB) > α,
or equivalently
∃B0 ∈ B(ρˇ(A B0) > α),
and decided by a non-deterministic polynomial algorithm similarly. We conclude that the two
problems belong to NP ∩ coNP.
For positive matrices, the proof for the other decision problem based on the second statement
of Theorem 18 is similar.
Our main complexity result follows immediately.
Theorem 20. Given an EG or an MMG with finite IRU-sets of non-negative matrices with
rational elements and α ∈ Q+, the decision problem for its value: V < α is in NP ∩ coNP.
6 Related Models
6.1 Weighted Entropy Games
Up to now we have considered entropy games with simple transitions, but it is straightforward
to add multiplicities (weights) to them. A weighted entropy game is played on a weighted arena
A = (D,T,Σ,∆, w) with a function w : ∆ → N+ assigning weights to transitions (informally
a weight is the number of ways in which a transition can be taken). Strategies and plays are
defined as in the unweighted case. Let L be some set of (infinite) plays. For every u ∈ pref(L)
we define its weight w(u) as the product of weights of all the transitions taken along u. We define
wn(L) =
∑
u∈pref4n(L)
w(u), and finally the payoff corresponding to strategies σ and τ of two
players is defined as:
P = lim sup
n→∞
(wn(L(σ, τ)))
1/n
.
Our main results on EGs (Thms 16 and 20) extend straightforwardly to weighted EGs.
6.2 Mean-Payoff Games
Well-known mean-payoff finite-state games (MPG) [11] can be considered as a deterministic sub-
class of weighted entropy games. A (variant of) MPG is played on arena (D,T,∆, w) with tran-
sition relation ∆ ⊆ D× T ∪ T ×D and weight function w : ∆→ N. The play starts in some state
d0 ∈ D, and the two players choose transitions in turn. The resulting play is an infinite word
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γd0 ∈ (D · T )ω. The mean-payoff corresponding to the play γd0 = d0, t0, d1, t1, . . . is the limit of
the average weight of transitions taken:
mp(γd0) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
(w(di−1, ti−1) + w(ti−1, di)).
Finally, player D wants to minimize and player T to maximize the payoff maxd0∈D mp(γd0). As
proved in [11], MPGs are determined and their optimal strategies are positional. As for complexity,
[24] shows that testing whether the value of an MPG is smaller than a rational α is in NP∩ coNP
and becomes polynomial for weights presented in the unary system.
An MPG A = (D,T,∆, w) can be transformed into a weighted EG A′ = (D,T,Σ,∆′, w′)
as follows. The states of both players are the same, Σ is large enough, and for each transition
(p, q) ∈ ∆ there is a corresponding transition (p, a, q) ∈ ∆′ with some a (occurring only in this
transition). Its weight is w′(p, a, q) = 2w(p,q). We notice that the EG obtained is deterministic:
due to unique transition labels for any strategies σ and τ , the language L(σ, τ) contains one play
for each initial state. Strategies and plays of both games A and A′ are now in natural bijection
and the payoff of A equals the logarithm of the payoff of A′.
This way, we obtain the classical results that MPGs are determined and both players have
optimal positional strategies. Due to the exponential encoding of payoffs, the complexity obtained
using our approach is, however, not as good as using direct algorithms, see [24].
6.3 Population Dynamics
Consider an EG with arena A = (D,T,Σ,∆). It can be interpreted as the following population
game between two players, Damien and Theo. Elements of D and T correspond to species (forms
of viruses, microorganisms, etc.). Initially there is one (or any non-zero number of) organism(s) for
each species in D. At his turn Damien chooses an action a ∈ Σ and applies it to each organism.
An organism of species d, when subject to action a, turns into the set of organisms of species
{t ∣∣ (d, a, t) ∈ ∆}. Theo plays similarly. The aim of Damien is to minimize the growth rate of the
population, while Theo wants to maximize it. The value of the game and the optimal (positional)
strategies are the same as for the EG.
7 Conclusions
We have introduced two (closely interrelated) families of games: entropy games played on finite
arenas (graphs), and matrix multiplication games. The main result is that entropy games are
determined and optimal strategies are positional in EG, while MMGs for IRU-sets of non-negative
matrices are determined and optimal strategies are constant. These results are based on a new
minimax theorem on spectral radii of products of IRU-sets of matrices. The results obtained prove
the existence of equilibria in zero-sum games with a new type of limit payoffs, which is neither
computed on a single play of the game nor probabilistic. On the other hand, they rely upon and
generalize important results on the computability of joint spectral radii and subradii, an important
problem in switching dynamic systems.
A presumably straightforward extension would be the “probabilization” of our game models,
in that both Despot and Tribune would be allowed to play randomized strategies. The minimax
theorem ensures the existence of optimal pure strategies for both players. However the entropy-
based payoff of the game needs to be given a proper generalization to this probabilistic setting. We
may mention that such a generalization could be seen as entropy games on stochastic branching
processes, and provide interesting links with this research domain. Finally, both our games are
turn-based games with perfect information. The first generalization to be considered is to go
to concurrent games — where perhaps some polynomial-size memory is needed, similarly to the
classic case of concurrent games played on graphs in infinite time. The more difficult case is that
of games of imperfect information: corresponding matrix games no longer have a simple structure
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(independent row uncertainty), and we conjecture that analysis of such games is non-computable.
Last but not least, potential applications sketched in the introduction should be addressed.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. (i) Let Ai be the set of admissible i-th rows in A ,
Ri =


[
n∑
k=1
akbkj
]
16j6n
∣∣∣∣∣∣ a ∈ Ai

 ,
and R be the IRU-set made from sets Ri. One has that AB = R:
• if M ∈ R then let a(i) ∈ Ai be such that the i-th row of M is
[∑n
k=1 a
(i)
k bkj
]
16j6n
,
then M = AB where A is the matrix made with rows ai;
• conversely, if A ∈ A and a(i) is the i-th row of A, then the i-th row of AB equals[∑n
k=1 a
(i)
k bkj
]
16j6n
and belongs to Ri.
(ii) The easy direction is ⊆. Let M be a matrix of conv(A ). Then, there exist matrices
M1, . . . ,Mk ∈ A and real numbers λ1, . . . , λk such that
M =
k∑
i=1
λiMi.
Let j be an integer in {1, . . . , n}. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists a vector vi ∈ Aj such
that row j of Mi is vi. Then, row j of M being
∑k
i=1 λivi, it belongs to convAj .
For the direction ⊇, let M be a matrix of the IRU-set formed by conv(A1), . . . , conv(An).
Let u1, . . . , un be the rows of the matrix M . By definition of M , there are integers ki
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, real numbers λij ∈ [0, 1] and vectors vij ∈ Ai for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
j ∈ {1, . . . , ki} such that
ui =
ki∑
j=1
λijv
i
j and
ki∑
j=1
λij = 1.
Then, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, one has:
ui =
ki∑
ji=1
λijiv
i
ji =

i−1∏
l=1
kl∑
jl=1
λljl



 ki∑
ji=1
λijiv
i
ji



 n∏
l=i+1
kl∑
jl=1
λljl

 = k1∑
j1=1
· · ·
kn∑
jn=1
(
n∏
l=1
λljl
)
viji .
Hence
M =


u1
...
un

 = k1∑
j1=1
· · ·
kn∑
jn=1
(
n∏
l=1
λljl
)
v1j1
...
vnjn

 ,
each matrix in the sum being in A . The proof is finished stating that
k1∑
j1=1
· · ·
kn∑
jn=1
n∏
l=1
λljl =
n∏
l=1
kl∑
jl=1
λljl = 1.
(iii) Immediate from the characterization of compact sets (of finite dimension) as bounded and
closed.
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Proof of Lemmas 3 and 4
In both lemmas, we announce that it is possible to reduce the halting problem of a 2-counter
Minsky machine (2CMM) to the threshold problem for MMG.
So let us first remind the reader about 2CMMs. Such a machine can be defined as a set of
instructions, indexed by a finite set of states Q, with q0 ∈ Q marked as initial, operating on two
non-negative integer counters x and y. There are three types of instructions (q... are states in Q,
and c is either x or y):
1. qi: increment c then execute qj ;
2. qi: if c = 0 execute qj , else decrement c then execute qk;
3. qi: stop.
The computation starts from instruction q0, executing it and thus triggering a sequence of in-
structions, which may be finite, if it eventually reaches a stop instruction, or otherwise infinite.
Whether or not the execution will be finite is undecidable.
Obviously, both reductions consist in encoding any 2CMM into an MMG, the payoffs of which
depend on whether the machine halts or not.
Now let us describe the encoding used in Lemma 3. Here the 2CMM is translated into two
sets A and E of square matrices of dimension |Q| + 5. States of the 2CMM (discrete location
and counter values) are encoded, along with some other information, as (row) vectors of the
space on which these matrices operate. The |Q| first coordinates of such a vector, labelled with
q0, . . . , q|Q|−1, take a non-zero value only for the current state of the simulation. The two next
coordinates x and y represent the two counters. Finally, there are three additional coordinates:
One,E and Neg (the role of which will be explained later on).
Eve’s matrices allow her to simulate the machine execution (as long as it goes on). The set E
consists in exactly one matrix per transition of the 2CMM (warning: instruction 2 consists in two
different transitions, depending on the test c = 0, while instruction 3 consists in no transition,
i.e., a state with stop instruction is a deadlock state). For the sake of presentation, we describe
them below as sets of assignments of variables, but it is easy to see that all assignments actually
are linear operations:
• matrices Iqq′c (as Increment): q := q −One; q′ := q′ +One; c := c+One;
• matrices Kqq′c (as Keep current counter value): q := q −One; q′ := q′ +One; c := −c;
• matrices Dqq′c (as Decrement): q := q −One; q′ := q′ +One; c := c− One.
Notice that matrix Kqq′c should be normally applied when c = 0, and thus the operation c = −c
does not harm. On the contrary, if it is applied illegally, for a positive counter value, then it results
in a negative c.
Adam has five kinds of matrices, which he can use to detect whenever Eve does not faithfully
simulate the machine, and then punish her by forcing a payoff of 0. Here is the set A :
• the matrix Init (initialize the 2CMM): q0 := E; qi6=0 := 0; x := 0; y := 0; One := E;
Neg := 0
• the identity matrix Id (do nothing and just let Eve continue playing);
• the matrices Fc (flash and take a picture of coordinate c) for c corresponding to a state or
a counter: Neg := c;
• the matrix A (adjust the value of Neg): Neg := Neg+One;
• the matrix P (punish Eve by assigning 0 to E): E = E +Neg.
Now, in order to prove Lemma 3, it suffices to prove the two following sublemmas:
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Lemma A.1. The MMG obtained by the translation above from a non-halting 2CMM is deter-
mined with value 1, i.e. it has the following properties:
1. there exists a strategy of Adam σ0 such that for any strategy τ of Eve, P (σ0, τ) 6 1;
2. there exists a strategy of Eve τ0 such that for any strategy σ of Adam, P (σ, τ0) > 1.
Lemma A.2. The MMG obtained by the translation above from a halting 2CMM is determined
with value 0, i.e. it has the following properties:
1. there exists a strategy of Adam σ0 such that for any strategy τ of Eve, P (σ0, τ) 6 0;
2. there exists a strategy of Eve τ0 such that for any strategy σ of Adam, P (σ, τ0) > 0.
Proof sketch of Lemma A.1. 1. Let the strategy σ0 consist in always playing identity. Then
maxτ P (σ0, τ) = ρˆ(E ). It is easy to see that applying a matrix of E to a vector only changes
the value of coordinates labelled by a state or by a counter, and only modifies it by adding
or removing the value of coordinate One (its value is left unchanged). Thus, for any vector
v and any sequence of matrices of E : E1, . . . , En, all coordinates of vector vE1 · · ·En are
bounded in absolute value by n ·vOne, which means that ‖E1 · · ·En‖ 6 k, and thus ρˆ(E ) 6 1.
2. Assume τ0 is as follows: Eve always stores in a variable t the last time Adam played Init
(initially t = 0). Then at turn i, she plays the matrix that corresponds to the (i − t)-th
transition of the execution of the 2CMM.
We fix a non-negative vector
v0 = (q0 = 1, qi6=0 = 0, x = 0, y = 0, E = 1, One = 1, Neg = 0)
and prove by induction the following invariant on the vector vn = v0A1E1A2E2 · · ·AnEn:
• all coordinates of vn are non-negative;
• vnE > 1.
Indeed applying a matrix of A while respecting the rules of the 2CMM ensures that state
and counter coordinates remain non-negative, while One,E and Neg remain unchanged.
On the other hand Adam’s matrices are all non-negative, implying the first bullet of the
invariant, and can only modify E by adding the value of Neg, which, by the invariant, was
non-negative at the previous step.
The above proves the invariant which implies the second item of the lemma.
Proof sketch of Lemma A.2. 1. For σ0, we consider the following strategy:
• first play Init: Adam initializes a simulation of the 2CMM in his private memory in
the form of a vector v0 = (q0 = 1, qi6=0 = 0, x = 0, y = 0, E = 1, One = 1, Neg = 0), on
which all subsequent matrices will be applied (yielding v1, v2, . . . );
• then play Id as long as Eve plays valid transitions of the 2CMM;
• play Fc as soon as Eve plays an invalid move (if Eve lied on a counter value, then c is
the name of this counter; if Eve lied on current state, then c is the name of this state;
in both cases this corresponds to a negative coordinate);
• play A until vnNeg = −1;
• finally play P (nulling E) and a last time Init (nulling the whole vector).
Explanation: the invariant from Lemma A.1 holds as long as Eve simulates the 2CMM.
When she stops simulating, the value of E is still 1 but some coordinate c is negative. The
ending sequence FcA · · ·AP Init forces the final vector to be 0, no move of Eve can then
prevent this from happening, as she cannot modify One,E or Neg.
Now remark that, for any vector v such that vE = 1, it holds that v · Init = v0 and thus
v ·Ω = 0 where Ω is the product matrix for the whole play until Adam plays a last time Init.
This proves that as much yields for any initial vector, thus Ω = 0 and therefore P (σ0, τ) = 0.
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2. The payoff function of an MMG is always non-negative.
Proof of Lemma 3. It directly follows from Lemmas A.1 and A.2.
Proof of Lemma 4. General idea: Here, in order to use only non-negative matrices, we introduce a
slightly different construction. Indeed, previous encoding relied on the fact that when Eve cheats, a
negative coordinate appears that Adam can use to punish her (by nulling the product matrix with
clever additions using the negative integers). Now there is no hope to create a negative element in
the product matrix (since the matrices of the MMG are non-negative), so the punishment will be
less drastic: Adam will just try to obtain a product that grows more slowly than the product of
matrices corresponding to a faithful simulation. For this Adam needs to reset the game infinitely
often, as to force Eve to cheat as many times, within a bounded horizon.
The encoding uses the following idea: a counter of value k is encoded at time n by a coordinate
of value 2n+k. This way, a counter decrement consists in keeping its coordinate value unchanged,
while a counter increment consists in multiplying its coordinate by 4. A counter stalling at a given
step still sees its coordinate multiplied by 2.
The vector space: Matrices are square of dimension |Q| + 4. They act on vectors such that
their |Q| first coordinates represent the states of the 2CMM (positive value only in the coordinate
corresponding to the active state of the simulation) and the four other coordinates x+, x−, y+, y−,
are the two counters and their opposite (i.e. their value will be 2n−c instead of 2n+c).
Eve’s matrices: In this game too, Eve tries to faithfully simulate the 2CMM. Her matrices are
the following:
• matrices Iqq′x: q′ := 2q; q := 0; x+ := 4x+; y+ := 2y+; y− := 2y−;
• matrices Kqq′x: q′ := 2q; q := 0; (x+, x−) := 2(x−, x+); (y+, y−) := 2(y−, y+);
• matrices Dqq′x: q′ := 2q; q := 0; x− := 4x−; y+ := 2y+; y− := 2y−;
• matrices Iqq′y, Kqq′y and Dqq′y are defined likewise.
Notice that the coordinate inversion of the previous construction, for the case of a successful
x = 0 test, is now translated as a coordinate swap between x+ and x−. Thus when Eve cheats on
a counter value, be it one way or the other, x+ has a value smaller than 2
n.
Adam’s matrices:
• matrix Id;
• matrices Px (and Py): q0 := x+; qi6=0 := 0; x− = x+; y+ = x+; y− = x+;
• matrices Pq: let s =
∑
q∈Q q then q0 := s; qi6=0 := 0; x+ = s;x− = s; y+ = s; y− = s.
Both P{x,y} and Pq reset the simulation, forcing the copied value as the new norm for the product
matrix.
Adam’s strategy consists in playing Id most of the time; playing Pq whenever Eve cheats on
the state, implying a null product; and playing Pc whenever Eve cheats on a counter c ∈ {x, y}
value, implying a factor of norm 6 2f−1 since the last time when Adam played a P matrix (factor
of length f).
Since Eve needs to cheat with a positive frequency if the run of the 2CMM is finite, then the
final payoff will be < 2 (from the product of such factors, which are of bounded length).
If the run is infinite, whether Adam plays Id or a P , there will be some coordinate that remains
of magnitude > 2n.
Details of the proof are similar to those of Lemma 3. We prove determinacy, with a value of
2, in the case when the 2CMM has an infinite run. For the other case we prove that Adam can
ensure a payoff < 2, but determinacy remains an open problem.
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Proof of Lemmas 7–17
Proof of Lemma 7. Assume D = {d1, . . . , dM} and T = {t1, . . . , tN}. Given arbitrary strategies
(σ, τ) for the two players in the EG, let us represent the set of all compatible plays as a forest.
Its nodes are labeled by elements of D on even levels and elements of T on odd levels, and its
edges are labeled by symbols in Σ. The label of a node q is denoted ℓ(q); the sequence of labels
on the path reaching q from the appropriate root in the forest is referred to as its address α(q).
The forest F is defined inductively as follows:
• F has M root nodes labeled by d1, . . . , dM ;
• all the outgoing edges of a node q labeled d ∈ D carry the symbol a = σ(α(q)) and the sons
of the node q correspond to (and are labeled by) the elements of {t | (d, a, t) ∈ ∆};
• all the outgoing edges of a node q labeled t ∈ T carry the symbol b = τ(α(q)) and the sons
of the node q correspond to (and are labeled by) the elements of {d | (t, a, d) ∈ ∆}.
The payoff of the EG can be characterized in terms of the growth rate of this forest:
P (σ, τ) = lim sup
n→∞
|F2n|1/n,
where Fk denotes the set of nodes of F at the level k. Indeed L(σ, τ) is the set of labels of infinite
paths of F, hence pref(L(σ, τ)) is the set of addresses of nodes in F (we use the fact that our
strategies are required to be non-blocking). To words of length 4n in pref(L(σ, τ)) correspond
addresses of nodes of level 2n, and thus
lim sup
n→∞
|pref4n(L(σ, τ))|1/n = lim sup
n→∞
|F2n|1/n
as required.
Let us characterize the number of nodes |F2n| in terms of matrices. Let the vector x(n) =
(x
(n)
1 , . . . , x
(n)
j ) be such that x
(n)
i is the number of nodes labeled by di on 2n-th level of F; similarly
let y(n) = (y
(n)
1 , . . . , y
(n)
N ) be such that y
(n)
j is the number of nodes labeled by tj on (2n + 1)-th
level of F. To relate y(n) to x(n) we observe that
y
(n)
j =
M∑
i=1
∑
a∈Σ
∣∣{q ∈ F2n ∣∣ ℓ(q) = di ∧ σ(α(q)) = a}∣∣ cia,j .
Indeed, every node on level 2n with label di and action a generates on the next level a node with
label tj whenever cia,j = 1. Summing up on all i, a and q we obtain the quantity y
(n)
j . The
expression for y can be rewritten as
y
(n)
j =
M∑
i=1
x
(n)
i
∑
a∈Σ
µiacia,j (17)
with µ
(n)
ia =
∣∣{q ∈ F2n ∣∣ ℓ(q) = di ∧ σ(α(q)) = a}∣∣ /x(n)i (whenever x(n)i = 0, coefficients µ(n)ia can
be chosen arbitrarily, only respecting conditions (18) below). Intuitively, µ
(n)
ia is the proportion
among the states di on level 2n, of those for which Despot takes the action a. In matrix form (17)
can be rewritten as y(n) = x(n)An with An,ij =
∑
a∈Σ µ
(n)
ia cia,j . We notice that
µ
(n)
ia > 0 and
∑
a∈Σ
µ
(n)
ia = 1, (18)
thus i-th row of An belongs to conv(Ai), hence An ∈ conv(A ). Similarly, x(n+1) = y(n)En for
some En ∈ conv(E ). Initially x(0) = (1, . . . , 1), and clearly |Fn| = x(n) · (1, . . . , 1)T, hence
|F2n| = (1, . . . , 1)A0E0A1E1 · · ·An−1En−1(1, . . . , 1)T = ‖A0E0A1E1 · · ·An−1En−1‖.
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Taking in the MMG over (conv(A )), conv(E )) the strategies ς and θ, which choose matrices
A0, E0, A1, E1, . . . we obtain the required:
PEG(σ, τ) = lim sup
n→∞
|F2n|1/n = lim sup
n→∞
‖A0E0A1E1 · · ·An−1En−1‖1/n = PMMG(ς, θ).
It is easy to see that for positional σ our construction gives An = Aσ for all n.
Proof of Lemma 10. As stated in [13, Corollary 8.1.29], for any nonnegative matrix A and u > 0
αu 6 Au 6 βu⇒ α 6 ρ(A) 6 β, (19)
our statement (i) is now immediate. Let us prove the three remaining assertions.
(ii) Let Au 6 ρu for u > 0 with A > 0 and Au 6= ρu. Then at least one coordinate of the vector
Au−ρu 6 0 is strictly negative. Therefore the condition A > 0 implies strict negativity of all
coordinates of the vector A(Au− ρu). Then there exists ε > 0 such that A(Au− ρu) 6 −εu
and therefore A2u = A(Au− ρu) + ρAu 6 (ρ2 − ε)u. Then, by (19), we get ρ(A2) 6 ρ2 − ε,
and thus ρ(A) 6
√
ρ2 − ε < ρ, q.e.d.
(iii) The condition Au > ρu with non-zero u > 0 implies Anu > ρnu for any n > 1. Then
‖An‖ · ‖u‖ > ‖Anu‖ > ρn‖u‖. Therefore ‖An‖ > ρn, and by Gelfand’s formula ρ(A) > ρ,
q.e.d.
(iv) Now let A > 0 and Au 6= ρu. Then at least one coordinate of the vector Au − ρu > 0 is
strictly positive. Therefore the condition A > 0 implies strict positivity of all the coordinates
of the vector A(Au− ρu). Then there exists ε > 0 such that A(Au− ρu) > εu and therefore
A2u = A(Au − ρu) + ρAu > (ρ2 + ε)u. This, by (iii) applied to the matrix A2, implies
ρ(A2) > ρ2 + ε, and thus ρ(A) >
√
ρ2 + ε > ρ, q.e.d.
Proof of Lemma 11. To prove (i), we represent the vectors u and v in coordinate form:
u = (u1, u2, . . . , uM )
T, v = (v1, v2, . . . , vN )
T.
Suppose that for some matrix A = (aij) ∈ A the inequality Au > v fails. Then
ai1u1 + ai2u2 + · · ·+ aiMuM < vi
for some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}; we may assume i = 1 without loss of generality. In this case, the matrix
A¯ =


a11 a12 · · · a1M
a˜21 a˜22 · · · a˜2M
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
a˜N1 a˜N2 · · · a˜NM

 ,
obtained from the matrix A˜ = (a˜ij) replacing the first row by a1 = [a11, a12, . . . , a1M ], yields
the inequalities a11u1 + a12u2 + · · · + a1MuM < v1; and a˜i1u1 + a˜i2u2 + · · · + a˜iMuM = vi for
i = 2, 3, . . . , N. Consequently, A¯u 6 v and A¯u 6= v, which completes the proof of the first statement
of the lemma. The proof of statement (ii) is similar.
Proof of Corollary 12. We denote V = mm(A ,B) and V ′ = mm(conv(A ), conv(B)). Then
V ′
1
= min
A∈conv(A )
max
B∈conv(B)
ρ(BA)
2
6 min
A∈A
max
B∈conv(B)
ρ(BA)
3
= min
A∈A
max
B∈B
ρ(BA) = V,
where 1 follows from the equality ρ(AB) = ρ(BA), 2 from the inclusion A ⊆ conv(A ), 3 from
Lemma 1 and equalities (3). Symmetrically,
V ′ = max
B∈conv(B)
min
A∈conv(A )
ρ(AB) > max
B∈B
min
A∈conv(A )
ρ(AB) = max
B∈B
min
A∈A
ρ(AB) = V.
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Proof of Lemma 15. Let σ′ and τ ′ be arbitrary strategies in the EG, then by Lemma 7 for the
strategy pair (σ′, τ) there is a corresponding pair (ς ′, Eτ ) with some strategy ς
′ having the same
value in the MMG. Symmetrically for the pair (σ, τ ′) there is a corresponding pair (Aσ, θ
′). We
have:
P (σ′, τ) = P (ς ′, Eτ ) 6 P (Aσ, Eτ ) = P (σ, τ) = P (Aσ, Eτ ) 6 P (Aσ, θ
′) = P (σ, τ ′),
where the equalities come from Lemma 7 and the inequalities from the optimality of Eτ and Aσ,
respectively. Thus σ and τ are optimal.
We will need the following result in order to prove Lemma 17.
Lemma A.3. Let A be a compact IRU-set of positive (N ×N)-matrices.
(i) If A˜ ∈ A is a matrix satisfying ρ(A˜) = ρˇ(A ) and v˜ is its positive eigenvector corresponding
to the eigenvalue ρ(A˜), then Av˜ > ρˇ(A )v˜ for all A ∈ A .
(ii) If A˜ ∈ A is a matrix satisfying ρ(A˜) = ρˆ(A ) and v˜ is its positive eigenvector corresponding
to the eigenvalue ρ(A˜), then Av˜ 6 ρˆ(A )v˜ for all A ∈ A .
Proof of Lemma A.3. To prove (i) let us note that A˜v˜ = ρˇ(A )v˜. Then by Lemma 11(i) either
Av˜ > ρˇ(A )v˜ for all A ∈ A or there exists a matrix A¯ ∈ A such that A¯v˜ 6 ρˇ(A )v˜ and A¯v˜ 6= ρˇ(A )v˜.
In the latter case, by Lemma 10 the inequality ρ(A¯) < ρˇ(A ) would hold, which contradicts to the
definition of ρˇ(A ). Hence, the inequality Av˜ > ρˇ(A )v˜ holds for all A ∈ A , q.e.d. Assertion (ii) is
proved similarly.
Proof of Lemma 17. For positive matrices, implications ⇐ follow from Lemma 10. As for ⇒, it
suffices to take v the eigenvector (corresponding to the spectral radius) of the matrix A˜ ∈ A with
the largest (smallest) spectral radius, and to apply Lemma A.3.
As for non-negative matrices, we have four implications to prove:
(12), ⇒ Denote, for any ε > 0, Aε = {A + ε1
∣∣ A ∈ A }. If ρˆ(A ) < α then due to compactness
of the set A there exists ε > 0 such that ρˆ(Aε) = ρˆ(A + ε1) < α. Then by (12) (already
proved for positive matrices), there exists v > 0 such that (A + ε1)v < αv for all A ∈ A .
Since Av 6 (A+ ε1)v, then Av < αv for all A ∈ A , q.e.d.
(12), ⇐ Suppose there exists v > 0 such that Av < αv for all A ∈ A . Then due to compactness
of the set A there exists ε > 0 such that (A + ε1)v < αv for all A ∈ A . Therefore by (12)
(for positive matrices) ρˆ(A + ε1) < α, and hence by the monotonicity of the spectral radius
we obtain ρˆ(A ) < α, q.e.d.
(16), ⇒ Let ρˇ(A ) > α, then by the monotonicity of the spectral radius it holds that ρˇ(A +ε1) > α
for any ε > 0. Then by (15) (for positive matrices) for any ε > 0 exists a vector vε > 0 such
that ‖vε‖ = 1 and
(A+ ε1)vε > αvε (20)
for all A ∈ A . Choose a sequence εn → 0 for which the corresponding vectors vεn converge
to some vector v > 0 (let us point out that ‖v‖ = 1 and so it is non-zero). Then passing to
the limit in (20) we obtain Av > αv for all A ∈ A , q.e.d.
(16), ⇐ Suppose there exists a non-zero vector v > 0 such that Av > αv for all A ∈ A . Then by
Lemma 10, ρ(A) > α for all A ∈ A and hence ρˇ(A ) > α, q.e.d.
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